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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Crawford's statement of facts is factually inaccurate in several material regards. 
The first such inaccuracy appears in the Crawford's "brief statement of procedural history." 
(Pg. 1) We are referring to the statement on pg. 1 that the Crawfords were not "parties to the 
action" at the time the district court first granted summary judgment against them.1 As can be 
plainly seen from the record of this case, the Crawfords were parties to the action before the 
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed. Murray City joined the Crawfords as parties to the 
action in its Answer and Counterclaim for Interpleader. (R. 13) NAC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed after Murray City answered the Complaint. (R. 20) The Motion for 
Summary Judgment itself reflects that the Crawfords were "Counterclaim Defendants" at that 
time. (R. 22) Inexplicably, the Crawfords concede in another part of their brief that they were 
parties to the action at the time Murray City filed its Answer, (pg. 8,1J19) though this plainly 
contradicts their earlier representations. 
The second such inaccuracy is more subtle and therefore much more indelible. 
Though they never come right out and say it, the Crawfords suggest throughout their brief 
that they received no notice of the action until NAC filed its Amended Complaint (three 
months later). That is the import of a statement appearing on pg. 4 of their brief: "Later, 
1
 This statement was repeated on pg. 4 of the Crawford's brief. 
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National filed an Amended Complaint, adding the Crawfords as defendants and seeking 
injunctive relief against them." This is also the import of a statement appearing on pg. 9, Tf24: 
"National's First Amended Complaint added the Crawfords as defendants and sought 
injunctive relief against them." 
NAC's Amended Complaint (R. 214) did not add the Crawfords as parties to the 
action. What it did was add new claims against the Crawfords and against Murray City.2 
When the district court granted NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment, NAC sought to 
remove its sign from the Crawford's property but the Crawfords refused to permit entry. (R. 
211) However, Paragraph 11 of the Lease required the Crawfords "to allow the Lessee full 
access to the property occupied by the displays for the purpose of erecting, maintaining, 
changing or removing the displays at any time" (R. 37) NAC had no count for injunctive 
relief or damages in its Complaint against either defendant. Therefore, NAC sought leave to 
amend its Complaint to add such claims. (R. 212) That is all the Amended Complaint did. 
Despite the obvious implication of the passages quoted in the paragraph above, 
including others throughout their brief, the Crawfords never actually claim lack of notice.3 
There is a good reason for this. There is evidence in the record, which the Crawfords have 
ignored in their brief, that they knew about the action and about NAC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at a time when they could have appeared and protected their rights. The evidence 
shows that the Crawfords (through their attorney) communicated with Murray City about the 
response to NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment. This evidence shows that Murray City 
2
 The claims were the same against each. 
3
 What they do claim is that they were not "parties" and were not "served." (See pp. 8-9, f21) 
2 
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tried to get the Crawfords to appear in the action and answer NAC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment for themselves. The evidence shows that the Crawfords chose to sit out NAC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and let Murray City make their arguments for them. 
The evidence we are referring to is the Affidavit of Cindy L. Tooms, (R. 143) of the 
Murray City Attorney's Office. In ^ [4 of the Affidavit, Ms. Tooms testified that Randy Hart, 
Murray City Attorney, instructed her to prepare an acceptance of service form for the 
Crawford's attorney to sign. This of course was for Murray City's Answer and Counterclaim 
for Interpleader (joining the Crawfords as defendants). Ms. Tooms was told by Mr. Hart that 
Martin Tanner, the Crawford's attorney, had agreed to accept service of the Counterclaim on 
behalf of the Crawfords. (Id.) 
On October 25, 1996, Ms. Tooms sent Mr. Tanner a copy of the Counterclaim and an 
Entry of Appearance for him to sign, (f 5) This was before NAC had even filed its Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 20) On November 4,1996, Ms. Tooms spoke with someone named 
"Sue" in Martin Tanner's office. Ms. Tooms was told by Sue that Mr. Tanner had "accepted 
service" of the Counterclaim for Indemnity on behalf of the Crawfords. (f6) On November 7, 
1996, Ms. Tooms left a message for Mr. Tanner about his failure to return the Entry of 
Appearance, (f [4])4 Ms. Tooms wrote Mr. Tanner a letter about this same subject that same 
day. (1f[5]) 
The most significant thing is that on that same day, November 7,1996, Cindy Tooms 
sent Martin Tanner a copy of NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment. fl[[6]) She and Mr. 
Tanner then discussed NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment "at length." d[7]) They also 
3 
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discussed "the arguments that Murray City would be making in response, and the necessity 
that Mr. Tanner file a response on behalf of his clients." (Id.) Ms. Tooms "was under the 
impression that Mr. Tanner would file a response." (Id.) It is easy to see why the Crawfords 
failed to comment on the substance of Ms. Tooms' Affidavit, though they do attempt to 
dismiss it with the lame objection that portions of it contain hearsay. (Pg. 8, f20)5 
NAC's Motion was served by hand-delivery on October 30, 1996. (R. 21) That made 
a response due November 12, 1996. No one requested an extension of time within which to 
file a response, though the undersigned would have granted such a request if it had been 
made. By the time Mr. Tanner was undeniably informed of the existence of the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, there was plenty of time for him to file a response if he so desired. The 
fact that he did not suggests he wanted to sit out the first round and see how it turned out. 
That way, if he did not like the result, he could formally appear for the Crawfords and try 
again. That seems to be the only explanation for his conduct in this case. In any event, the 
Crawfords can hardly complain about "lack of notice." 
The Crawfords claim to have terminated the Lease in advance of its term, the last day 
of which was February 1,1997. (Pp. 5-6, t|8-10) They claim to have done this in accordance 
with Paragraph 9 of the Lease. (Pg. 6, f 8) However, Paragraph 9 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: "In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the Lessee's 
displays is to be improved by permanent construction or remodeling, as evidenced by a 
4
 There was an error in the numbering of the paragraphs. 
5
 Which of course avails them nothing since they did not move to strike the Affidavit. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
James Constructors. Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). 
4 
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building permit, requiring the removal of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate 
this lease...." (R. 37) 
Just as the Crawfords claim, they provided NAC with a copy of their site plan. (Pg. 6, 
f^lO) The site plan is part of the record in this case. (R. 122) The Court may note that NACs 
sign did not conflict with any of the structural improvements intended by the Crawfords. The 
Crawford's site plan clearly demonstrates that NACs sign merely occupied four new parking 
spaces. NAC concluded that on the basis of the site plan, Paragraph 9 did not require removal 
of its sign. 
NAC also noted what appears in the upper right-hand corner of the site plan: The 
typewritten language, "New Location for Billboard Sign (Relocated)." This showed that the 
Crawfords had at one time made allowance for NACs sign. The Crawfords never claimed 
that the site plan had changed in such a way that required removal of NACs sign. NAC 
justifiably concluded that the Crawfords were using Paragraph 9 of the Lease as a pretext to 
get NAC to remove its sign. After all, as we now know, the Crawfords had applied for a sign 
permit of their own before notifying NAC that its sign had to go. (Pg. 6, ]fl2) It is obvious 
that the Crawfords wanted a sign of their own and that was what required removal of NACs 
sign. Their remodeling efforts had nothing to do with it. 
Paragraph 9 aside, the Crawfords recognized that their sign permit would expire 
before termination of NACs Lease. (Pg. 7, % 14) Because of this, Murray City rescinded the 
Crawford's permit on September 10,1996. (R. 61, f 12) Murray City recognized the necessity 
of this because the Crawford's permit was "not to become effective unless and until [NACs] 
sign was removed from the Property." (R. 60, f 7) Since the Crawfords did not have it in their 
5 
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power to remove NAC's sign any sooner than the end of the Lease term, which would have 
been longer than the 180-day term for the sign permit, Murray City had no choice but to 
rescind the Crawford's sign permit. However, at the Crawford's request, Murray City 
extended their permit another 180 days (R. 61, fl 1) even though they had no ability to begin 
construction within the original period. This extension was the only basis on which the 
Crawfords can claim that their permit was valid. Obviously, as recognized by the district 
court, their original permit was void ab inito. This was the principled basis on which the 
district court granted NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
NAC, on the other hand, did have a valid permit at the time it was issued (August 5, 
1996). (Rr. 60-61, f9) NAC's permit was similarly conditioned "not to become effective 
unless and until [NAC] removed its existing sign from the Property and the Lessors' sign 
permit expired." (Id.) However, unlike the Crawfords, NAC had it within its power to remove 
its own sign and terminate the Lease within the 180-day term of its permit. Paragraph 11 of 
the Lease provides that "[a]ll structures, displays and materials placed upon the said property 
by the Lessee are Lessee's trade fixtures and equipment,.. .and may be removed by the Lessee 
at any time prior to.. .termination of this lease or any extension thereof." (R. 37) Of course, in 
such a case, NAC would have remained obligated to pay rent to the Crawfords, but Murray 
City's condition would have been satisfied. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Due process was satisfied in this case. The Crawfords received notice of the 
action and of NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment before it was decided. They even 
participated in the drafting of a response by Murray City. It was their choice to stay out of the 
6 
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action at a time when they could have appeared to defend their interests. They did so for the 
obvious purpose of having another "bite at the apple" in case the district court ruled against 
Murray City and in NAC's favor. After NAC's Motion was granted, the Crawfords appeared 
and made their own arguments and defenses to the action. By NAC's count, they had five 
separate opportunities to present their case after the district court granted NAC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The Crawfords suggest that Judge Frederick ignored their case after 
granting NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment, but there is nothing in the record to support 
this contention. Due process requires "the right to a hearing before a competent court, with 
the privilege of being heard and introducing evidence." The Crawfords had that right in 
spades. 
2. There has to be a principled basis for distinguishing between the two 
conflicting sign permits. The Crawfords argue that theirs should prevail because it was first 
in time. That is not a very principled basis for any decision. NAC argued that its permit 
should prevail because it was the only one of the two permit holders who could satisfy the 
permit's condition within the 180-day term of the permit. Both permits were conditioned on 
removal of NAC's sign. For reasons explained more fully above (and below), only NAC had 
the power to remove its sign within the 180-day term of its permit. NAC argued to the district 
court that this made the Crawford's permit void ab initio and the district court agreed. In fact, 
Murray rescinded the Crawford's permit for this very reason, though it was later reinstated at 
request of the Crawfords. By that time, however, NAC had a valid sign permit of its own that 
precluded reinstatement or extension of the Crawford's permit. There were no genuine issues 
7 
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as to any of the facts material to this determination. Thus, summary judgment was properly 
granted in NAC's favor. 
3. Summary judgment may be granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and...the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law'' Rule 
56(c), URCP. The Crawfords forgot the second element of this Rule. They were not entitled 
to summary judgment just because NAC did not raise any factual issues in opposition thereto. 
They may have satisfied the first part of the Rule, but (for reasons stated above) they were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the district court acted correctly in 
denying their Motion. 
4. The Crawfords are wrong when they say that NAC's second Motion for 
Summary Judgment was not supported by a "statement of facts." They recognized otherwise 
at the time they responded to the Motion. In any event, NAC's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment was necessitated only by Rule 54(b), URCP. Even though the district court had 
rejected the Crawford's Motion for Summary Judgment, their claims still remained. There 
was nothing new to say at that point, which is why NAC merely referred to its earlier Motion 
for Summary Judgment. For their part, the Crawfords said nothing new either. They merely 
referred to the facts stated in all their previous pleadings. There was no error in granting the 
technically necessary though practically inconsequential second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
8 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE CRAWFORDS HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY 
TO PRESENT THEIR CASE. 
The Crawfords are careful not to say that they were denied an opportunity to be heard 
in this case. They were certainly given such an opportunity when Murray City mailed their 
counsel a copy of the Counterclaim for Interpleader. They were given such an opportunity 
when Murray City mailed their counsel a copy of NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
They were given such an opportunity when Murray City discussed with their counsel the 
substance of NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment and the response thereto. Murray City 
plainly desired for the Crawfords to appear in the action and defend themselves. However, 
there is no suggestion that Murray City did not make the arguments against NAC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment that had been discussed with counsel for the Crawfords. 
Murray City's interest in the matter was such that it had good reason to resist NAC's 
Motion. Murray City is the one who (innocently) created the problem that gave rise to the 
action. It issued competing sign permits to the Crawfords and to NAC that left them with no 
alternative to litigation. Unfortunately, Murray City had to be a party to this litigation, but the 
Crawfords did not. There was no dispute between the Crawfords and NAC. NAC could not 
complain about the Crawfords' applying for a sign permit before the end of the Lease term. 
Similarly, NAC could not complain to the Crawfords about the permit issued to them by 
Murray City. The only person to whom NAC could complain, about the Crawfords' permit, 
was Murray City. Murray City had to defend itself against the charges that it acted unlawfully 
in issuing the Crawfords'sign permit. 
9 
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This helps explain why NAC did not join the Crawfords in the first place. NAC gave 
a fuller explanation in its Memorandum in Opposition to Murray City's Motion to Substitute 
and for Realignment of Parties (R. 73): 
Murray City's removal from the action would eliminate the only 
justiciable controversy that exists in this case. There is no dispute between 
[NAC] and the putative third-party defendants: Gene B. Crawford and Sherry 
T. Crawford dba Val-Dev L.L.C. [NAC] has a sign on property owned by the 
Crawfords; [NAC] pays rent according to the terms of the lease between 
[NAC] and the Crawfords. That lease is presently existing and in good 
standing. 
After NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, the Crawfords were given 
several more opportunities to be heard. The first such opportunity was their Motion to 
Reconsider the Summary Judgment, for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction and for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 85) In support of their Motions, the Crawfords filed a seven-page 
Memorandum in Support containing twelve separate factual statements and four separate 
arguments. (R. 89) The Motion was also supported by a three-page Affidavit of Brad 
Crawford (R. 98) containing a pair of exhibits; and also by a two-page Affidavit of Anne 
Vonweller (R. 106) containing several more exhibits. Finally, the Crawfords also filed a 
three-page Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider and for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 190) It is plain to see that in all these pleadings, the Crawfords made the same 
arguments in the trial court that now they make on appeal. All of this was therefore before the 
district court before entry of final judgment in this case. 
The second such opportunity was in opposition to NAC's Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order. (R. 174) The Crawfords filed a two-page Objection to Motion for 
10 
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Temporary Restraining Order. (R. 200) The third such opportunity was in their twelve-page 
Answer to First Amended Complaint, Cross-Claim and Counterclaim. (R. 229) 
The Counterclaim contained nineteen separate factual allegations. (Rr. 237-40) The fourth 
such opportunity was in their Motion for Summary Judgment on Cross-Claim and 
Counterclaim. (R. 291) In support of said Motions, the Crawfords filed a nine-page 
Memorandum in Support containing twelve separate factual statements and five exhibits. (R. 
263) The Crawfords also filed a six-page Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Cross-Claim and Counterclaim containing two more exhibits. (R. 303) 
The fifth such opportunity was in opposition to NAC's (final) Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 321) In response, the Crawfords filed a four-page Memorandum in Opposition. 
(R. 328) It is plain to see that the Crawfords made the same arguments in these pleadings that 
they now make on appeal. All of this was therefore before the district court before entry of 
final judgment. 
Throughout their brief, the Crawfords suggest that Judge Frederick ignored everything 
filed in the case after the Crawfords finally appeared: "On this first fatally flawed ruling 
[granting NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment], the trial court based its subsequent denial 
of the Crawfords' Motion to Reconsider and the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on their Counterclaim, and its grant of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment." 
(Pg. 12) And again: "This unconstitutional ruling [granting NAC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment] subsequently formed the basis for the trial court's: (1) denial of the Crawfords' 
Motion to Reconsider; (2) denial of the Crawfords' Motion for Summary Judgment on their 
Counterclaim; and (3) granting of National's second Motion for Summary Judgment." (Pg. 
11 
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19) Hidden away in their "Conclusion," however, the Crawfords come right out and say it: 
"Indeed, the trial court never gave the evidence presented by the Crawfords even a cursory 
review, let alone the type of fair and serious review required by the Utah and federal 
constitutions." (Pg. 27) 
There is nothing in the record of this case to support any of these statements. Though 
the Crawfords give three record references for the first such statement, (pg. 12) they all say 
that the various motions were granted or denied for reasons stated in NAC's Memoranda. (Rr. 
78, 316, 348-49) There is nothing in any of those references to suggest that Judge Frederick 
simply ignored what was before him and returned to the reasoning behind his original ruling. 
There is no way to know why Judge Frederick ruled the way he did, except in the record of 
the case. And in each case, he gave reasons that suggested he was paying the utmost attention 
to the matter. To suggest otherwise is to impugn one of the finest judges on the Utah bench. 
The Crawfords cite a great many due process cases in their brief. They all state 
general principles of constitutional law that are completely unobjectionable.6 Unfortunately, 
none of those cases advances the issue in this case. 
Celebrity Club Incorporated v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293 
(Utah 1982) is the one relied upon most heavily by the Crawfords. (Pg. 16) Its most salient 
point, with respect to this case, is that "a party shall have his day in court - that is each party 
shall have the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being heard 
and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense,...." 657 P.2d at 1296. In that 
6
 . For instance, the Crawfords spend most of their time arguing that their sign permit is a "property interest," 
(pp. 13-15) something NAC has never denied. 
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case, the owner of a private club had its state-controlled liquor license revoked. There was a 
public hearing, but the owner of the club was neither notified nor invited. This was done 
under a statutory scheme that was plainly unconstitutional, and the Court ruled as such. 
That is a far cry from what happened here. The Crawfords appeared in the action 
shortly after the first Motion for Summary Judgment was decided. Judgment did not become 
final until the Crawfords had five more opportunities to make out their causes and defenses. 
Every party is entitled to "a hearing before a competent court, with the privilege of being 
heard and introducing evidence to establish his cause or his defense,...." 657 P.2d at 1296. 
We say that happened here in spades. 
The Crawfords' real point seems to be that a due process violation, if established, can 
never be remedied. In other words, if there is a due process violation at the start of a case, a 
party with notice of the proceeding may sit back, take no action and reap the benefits. Worse 
yet, according to the Crawfords, a party may later appear in the action and defend its interests, 
but will get a new hearing no matter the extent to which it was able to state its position and 
defend its interests. There is no authority for this ridiculous assertion, at least none cited by 
the Crawfords. Notice is notice. Once you have it, you fail to act your own peril. Assuming 
(as we must) that the decision by the Crawfords to sit out the first Motion for Summary 
Judgment was calculated, due process has been completely satisfied. 
II. THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF FACT MATERIAL TO THE QUESTION OF 
WHOSE PREMIT SHOULD PREVAIL, AND NAC WAS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The second half of the Crawford's appeal has to do with the merits of the case: In 
other words, whose permit should prevail. There was never any question in this case that 
13 
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these were conflicting permits and that they both could not be valid. (Pg. 3) For the 
Crawfords, the question settled on whose permit was issued first. (Pp. 22-23) But this 
assumed that the Crawford's permit was valid in the first place. The Crawfords keep 
forgetting that their permit was conditioned on removal of NAC s existing sign. However, 
there was no way for the Crawfords to get NAC's sign removed before their permit expired. 
As a practical matter, this made the Crawford's permit void when it was issued. Of course, 
this was recognized by Murray City when it invalidated the Crawford's permit. 
Unfortunately, by the time the Crawfords got their permit reinstated, NAC already had a valid 
permit that pre-empted theirs. 
All of the Crawford's efforts in this regard center on their attempt to terminate the 
Lease within the 180-day term of the permit. The Crawfords seized on Paragraph 9 of the 
Lease. On April 23,1996, the Crawfords notified NAC "that [they were] developing the 
Property and that [NAC's] sign must be removed." (Pp. 5-6, f 8) This "notice" came in the 
form of a letter from Brad Crawford, (R. 108) attorney in fact for the owners of the property. 
Mr. Crawford claimed as follows: "It has been determined that your sign is located in an area 
that will be used for parking for this new development. Because your sign will hinder 
development, I request that you remove the sign as soon as possible." 
NAC was not required to accept Mr. Crawford's unsubstantiated assertion. Paragraph 
9 of the Lease required proof of remodeling or improvement in the form of a "building 
permit." (R. 37) Mr. Crawford seems to have recognized this in his second notice (June 10, 
1996): "A copy of the building permit for the new development will be sent as soon as it is 
issued." (R. 109) Mr. Crawford apparently complied with the building permit requirement on 
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August 3, 1996. (R. I l l ) However, he went beyond the specific requirements of the Lease 
and provided NAC with a "site plan showing the proposed use of the area where the sign is 
located." (R. 112) 
From the start, NAC had its doubts whether Paragraph 9 applied to this situation. 
After all, Paragraph 9 speaks of "permanent construction or remodeling... requiring removal 
of the Lessee's displays." (R. 37) That did not appear to be the case with the Crawford's 
parking lot. However, when NAC saw the Crawford's site plan, its doubts were sealed. 
It is obvious that provision had originally been made for relocating the sign. This is 
apparent from the printed language in the upper right-hand corner of the site plan: "New 
Location for Billboard Sign (Relocated)." (R. 122) However, none of Mr. Crawford's notices 
mentioned relocating the sign. (Rr. 108, 109, 111) All they mentioned was removing the sign. 
NAC suspicions were confirmed when it learned, shortly after receiving the site plan, that the 
Crawfords had applied for a sign permit shortly before giving their first notice. (Pg. 6, f 12) 
It is obvious that the Crawfords wanted NAC to remove its sign, possibly on the guise 
of relocating it elsewhere on the property. If it had done so, NAC would have been denied a 
permit because of the Crawford's existing permit. Whatever the motives of the Crawfords, it 
is apparent that Paragraph 9 of the Lease did not apply to this situation. The Crawford's site 
plan demonstrated that the remodeling did not "require removal" of NAC s sign. At most, it 
required "relocation" of the sign, but that, unfortunately, was not covered by the Lease. 
Therefore, the Crawfords could not terminate the Lease until its anniversary (February 1, 
1997). By then, it was too late. 
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In a last, desperate effort to avoid summary judgment, the Crawfords claim: "The trial 
court erred by not acknowledging the evidence and failing to grant summary judgment for the 
Crawfords, or at a minimum, ruling that summary judgment for [NAC] was precluded by 
genuine, material issues of fact" (Pg. 23) However, the Crawfords identify no such issues. 
The fact is that none of the Crawford's factual statements were placed in issue by NAC. NAC 
responded to the Crawford's Motion for Summary Judgment by objecting that a great many 
such statements were legal conclusions. (Rr. 295-96) However, NAC never denied the 
genuineness of any of those statements. In fact, NAC admitted a great many of such 
statements. Without any factual issues to resolve at trial, the district court was permitted to 
decide the case on summary judgment as a matter of law. 
m. THE CRAWFORDS CANNOT PREVAIL ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT JUST 
BECAUSE NAC DID NOT RAISE ANY FACTUAL ISSUES IN RESPONSE TO 
THEIRMOTION. 
This third argument of the Crawfords is just plain wrong. They contend that the 
district court should have granted their Summary Judgment Motion because NAC did not 
raise any factual issues in response thereto. In so arguing, they make a common mistake 
when it comes to summary judgment jurisprudence. They rely on Rule 56(e) to the effect that 
"[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." (Pg. 24) 
However, they stop short of the truth because they fail to quote all of the very next 
sentence: "If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
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against him." Those two words make obvious reference to Rule 56(c): "The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled a judgment as a matter of law." There are two 
parts to summary judgment analysis. There may be no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
as in this case, but the moving party may not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This 
is just the flip side of the Crawford's argument above. Since there was no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and NAC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the district court was 
correct in granting NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment and, for the same reasons, denying 
the Crawford's own. 
Actually, the Crawfords cannot have been unmindful of their mistake. They quoted 
the last sentence of Rule 56(e), but left out the two operative words. (Pg. 24) They have cited 
no authority (other than the Rule) for their mistaken contention that "if a party opposing 
summary judgment does not satisfy the burden imposed by Rule 56, summary judgment 
'shall be entered against him.'" (emphasis in original) The case authority that stands against 
them, among many others, is Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982): "[U]nder Rule 56, 
URCP, it is not always required that a party proffer affidavits in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment in order to avoid judgment against him....Rule 56(e) states specifically 
that a response in opposition to a motion must be supported by affidavits or other documents 
only in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Where the party 
opposed to the motion submits no documents in opposition, the moving party may be granted 
summary judgment only 'if appropriate,' that is, if he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
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law." 658 P.2d at 586. By twisting the clear meaning of this Rule, the Crawfords have done 
the Court and themselves a great disservice. 
NAC needs to be mindful of one mistake of its own. In response to the Crawford's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, NAC did say that the Crawfords had failed to present a 
building permit in support of their attempt to terminate the Lease before February 1,1997. (R. 
297) This statement was wrong, of course. However, this mistake could not have been the 
basis for any serious misunderstanding on the part of the trial court. NAC went on to say that 
the real reason the Crawfords could not terminate the Lease is that their improvements did not 
"require removal" of the sign. (R. 298) 
IV. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A FACTUAL STATEMENT IN NAC'S 
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Even though the trial court had already granted NAC's first Motion for Summary 
Judgment and denied all of the Crawford's Motions bearing on the same issues, the Crawfords 
contend that the trial court should not have granted NAC's second Motion for Summary 
Judgment because it did not contain a factual statement. (Pg. 26) Actually, the Crawfords did 
not make this argument below. 
At the time they were responding to NAC's second Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Crawfords recognized that NAC had "referenced its prior Motion for Summary 
Judgment." (R. 329) Because of this, the Crawfords "assume[d] that the Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts contained in that motion [the first Motion for Summary Judgment] 
[were] incorporated into the plaintiffs second motion." (Id.) In this, the Crawfords were 
correct. However, this does not square with their arguments on appeal. As for the Crawford's 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
own "Additional Material Facts," all they did was refer to all their previous pleadings filed in 
the case, (R. 330) which is no worse than what NAC did in supporting its Motion. 
NAC's second Motion for Summary Judgment was necessitated only by Rule 54(b), 
URCP. As stated above, the Crawfords filed a Counterclaim against NAC and a Cross-Claim 
against Murray City. (R. 229) The Crawfords moved for summary judgment on both these 
pleadings. (R. 291) The district court denied the Crawford's Motion "for the reasons 
specified in the opposing memorandum." (R. 316) Even though the district court denied the 
Motion, it did not dismiss the claims contained in those pleadings. (Id.) It was technically 
necessary (as stated by NAC) to file a second Motion for Summary Judgment to get those 
claims dismissed so there could be a final, appealable judgment. (R. 324)7 
As stated in NAC's Memorandum in Reply, there was nothing new in the Crawford's 
response. (R. 338) NAC explained to the district court that he might then "enter a final, 
appealable order granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and dismissing the 
remainder of this action, including all claims by the Crawfords." (R. 339) The district court, 
of course, granted the Motion "for the reasons specified in the supporting memoranda." (R. 
343) 
CONCLUSION 
It should be apparent by now that the Crawfords got their day in Court. In fact, they 
had many days in Court. They could have had those days in Court earlier than they did, but it 
was their choice to sit out the proceedings at that early stage. It is difficult to see how that did 
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them any harm. They were able to discuss with Murray City the response to be made to 
NAC's Motion for Summary Judgment. Murray City appeared in the action and vigorously 
opposed the Motion. Murray City made many of the arguments that the Crawfords would 
later make on their own. After that, the Crawfords had many chances to make their own 
arguments. The district court had to make a decision between the two permits, and he had 
before him all the information the Crawfords claim was material to the question. Due process 
was satisfied in this case. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were also satisfied. There were no issues as to any 
material facts. This meant that the district court was permitted to rule as a matter of law. He 
ruled as a matter of law that the Crawford's permit was invalid when it was issued. He must 
have concluded that the Crawfords could not satisfy the condition to their permit within the 
180-day term of the permit. He must have concluded that the Crawford's attempts to 
terminate the Lease before its February 1,1997 term were unavailing. He also must have 
concluded that NAC's permit was a different matter. Under Paragraph 11 of the Lease, NAC 
had the right to remove its sign, at any time, and satisfy the condition to its permit. NAC's 
permit was issued before the Crawford's permit was reinstated or extended. Therefore, 
neither reinstatement nor extension had any practical effect. The Crawford's permit therefore 
violated the spacing requirements of Murray City and was void for that reason. NAC's 
permit, on the other hand, was the only valid permit. 
7
 There was also a claim for damages in NAC's First Amended Complaint. (R. 220) The pendency of this claim 
would have prevented entry of a final, appealable order. NAC moved to dismiss said claim with prejudice at the 
time it filed the second Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 324) 
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For all the foregoing reasons, NAC respectfully urges the Court to affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
DATED this 29th day of January, 1999. 
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